Strategic Stability · Horizon 2026–2030

Borders Are Fixed, But Threats Aren’t

Rethinking the Meaning of Security

By: Hemapriya
Published: 26 October 2026
Horizon: 2026–2030
Pillar: Strategic Stability
Anchors: New Delhi
Reading time: 5 minutes

The new perimeter: the layers of security around India's border · Map: ALTARA Map Studio, Natural Earth data

Readiness

A border can be seen. A cyber attack cannot be seen. The location of a military base can be determined, but that of a disinformation attack cannot be. An energy disruption may occur way outside of a nation’s borders yet affect its economy. This is redefining the definition of national security. Speaking on 24 September, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh referred to the inclination to regard security in terms of geographical frontiers as the “perimeter fallacy”. He cited drones, cyber attacks, lone wolf attacks and disinformation along with conventional military threats, while also associating national security with economic and energy security.

The concept is important since despite the constant increase in the ways that the state could be endangered, the physical border line has not changed. In most cases in the modern military era, territorial defence involved stopping the opponent from entering a particular demarcated line. Troops, fences, artillery, surveillance, and border posts were thus key components of the security architecture. However, it is possible to destabilise a state without occupying its physical territory. The battleground has spread to networks, infrastructure, information systems and outer space.

Perhaps the most obvious one is the use of the drone. The drone does not need an actual pilot to cross borders, and its importance does not depend only on the explosive payload it might be carrying. It can detect and locate targets, test air defence systems, and provide data to other systems. It is an effort which reduces the distance between surveillance and attack, as well as the separation between the battle zone and what lies beyond.

This is taken to an extreme by cyber warfare. The grid, network or communication system may have a physical presence within a country, but the software, information flows, and technological linkages may reach far beyond that country’s borders. Consequently, an adversary does not necessarily need to breach any boundary to disrupt important systems. The location of the asset and that of the threat may be completely distinct from one another.

This is the strategic dilemma facing governments. Traditional security planning asks what point an enemy might attack. Modern security planning must increasingly ask which systems an adversary could disrupt remotely.

Infrastructure for Security Purposes

The expanding security perimeter can also be seen in the correlation between military power and infrastructure. Modern armies rely on electrical energy, communications, satellite guidance systems, data centres, harbours, transportation systems and fuel sources. Although these are not considered military assets, they are vital for any military operation to function.

The same applies to the economy too. Disruptions in shipping lanes could cause higher transport costs. An energy supply shock could impact industrial production. Telecommunications being affected can interfere with finance and commerce. Consequently, Mr. Rajnath made the connection between national security and economic and energy security because an enemy state can try to undermine the economy or energy transportation networks.

This has an important implication. Safeguarding the power of the nation means safeguarding the infrastructure that makes that power possible. The security periphery is thus not limited to the physical boundaries of the state, but it also covers the technology that the economy and military depend on.

The Information Has No Border

This creates an additional area of weakness in that the physical event resulting from a normal attack is detectable, while information attacks can be based on perception rather than destruction. The disinformation campaign may use pre-existing societal divides, manufacture false stories, and cause confusion without having to be physically present in the targeted country. Defence Minister also pointed out that smear campaigns and disinformation could be used to create chaos.

This does not mean every online falsehood is a national-security operation. The difference between the various kinds of disinformation needs to be appreciated. Yet the strategic implication is apparent: while information can flow across borders almost instantaneously, the entities that need to react to it continue to operate almost entirely nationally. As such, technology has created a disconnect between the rapidity of the threat and the conventional geography of state security.

The idea of a security boundary in its old form is becoming even more difficult to maintain. The modern conduct of warfare relies heavily on satellites that provide communication, navigation, and surveillance, which go far beyond the area they are meant to cover. Indigenous Indian defence strategy itself understands the expanded battlefield. According to Mr. Singh, some of the fields where India is developing capabilities include drones, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, electronic warfare, and space and quantum technologies.

He also described “Terrain, Technology and Thinking” as important factors in modern warfare.

The importance here is not only that new technology is being added to current military forces. It is technology that is transforming the very object which has to be protected.

The New Perimeter Is a System

This does not diminish the importance of geographical frontiers. Geographical frontiers will remain the bedrock of sovereignty and territorial defence. India will require robust land, air, and sea defences for protecting its territorial frontiers. The new reality is that the border can no longer be seen as the entirety of the national security perimeter.

Another way to illustrate the contemporary security environment is to depict it as layers of security: territory in the centre, with infrastructure, networks, logistics, information, and space around it. Any vulnerability in any of the layers could affect the other layers as well.

This also affects the conduct of diplomacy since threats can be transmitted not only through supply chains, cyberspace, maritime routes, and technological networks, but also beyond the borders of any nation-state. Defence readiness also includes partnerships, information sharing, cooperation on technology, resilience of supply chains, and coordination internationally.

Singh believed that military readiness and diplomacy go hand in hand, cautioning that military readiness without diplomacy can lead to confrontation, and diplomacy without military capability can be dangerous for security.

Beyond the Border

The real significance of the “perimeter fallacy” is not that geography has become irrelevant, but that geography has ceased to encompass all of the geography of power. There is a possibility for a nation to have its border in place but still be under cyber attack on its communications, energy, information environment, or infrastructure.

On the other hand, a nation may improve its defences in territory but be vulnerable because of technologies not confined to the battlefield environment. Future generations of national security will no longer be focused on defence of the line, but rather the defence of a web of dependencies.

There will be more challenges than ever to come from within a nation’s system of international relations, but borders will always denote the beginning and end of sovereignty. The strategic problem now is not just about stopping the opponent from crossing the border. The problem now is about making sure that even if the threat crosses the border virtually, remotely, or economically, access does not become an open door to disruption.